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Promoting a better understanding of statistical data is becoming increasingly 
important for improving risk comprehension and decision-making. In this regard, 
previous studies on Bayesian problem solving have shown that iconic representations 
help infer frequencies in sets and subsets. Nevertheless, the mechanisms by which icons 
enhance performance remain unclear. Here, we tested the hypothesis that the benefit 
offered by icon arrays lies in a better alignment between presented and requested 
relationships, which should facilitate the comprehension of the requested ratio beyond 
the represented quantities. To this end, we analyzed individual risk estimates based on 
data presented either in standard verbal presentations (percentages and natural 
frequency formats) or as icon arrays. Compared to the other formats, icons led to 
estimates that were more accurate and, importantly, promoted the use of equivalent 
expressions for the requested probability. Furthermore, whereas the accuracy of the 
estimates based on verbal formats depended on their alignment with the text, all the 
estimates based on icons were equally accurate.  Therefore, these results support the 
proposal that icons enhance the comprehension of the ratio and its mapping onto the 
requested probability and point to relational misalignment as potential interference for 
text-based Bayesian reasoning. The present findings also argue against an intrinsic 
difficulty with understanding single-event probabilities. 
 
Keywords: probabilistic reasoning, iconic representation, relational alignment, Bayesian 
problem solving, risk comprehension  
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Introduction 
 
Everyday decision-making, in areas ranging from healthcare to finance, often 
requires the integration of different pieces of statistical information to infer the 
probability of relevant outcomes. For example, the decision to participate in breast 
cancer screening (i.e., mammograms) depends, among other factors, on the perceived 
predictive value of the test (e.g., Navarrete et al., 2015). This commonly requires 
considering different data: the breast cancer prevalence (the base rate), and the 
conditional probabilities of a positive mammogram in the presence (hit rate) and in the 
absence (false-alarm rate) of breast cancer. The cognitive demands involved in this 
inference (comprehension of the data and the corresponding arithmetic calculations), as 
well as potentially helpful strategies, have been the subject of widespread research in 
the field of Bayesian reasoning (e.g., see recent reviews in Mandel & Navarrete, 2015).  
In a typical Bayesian problem, solvers are presented with the above information 
(base rate, hit rate and false-alarm rate) and required to calculate the Bayesian 
probability (e.g., the posterior probability of having breast cancer in the case of 
receiving a positive mammogram; see examples in the appendix). It is well known that 
this is no trivial task; the percentage of participants producing accurate estimates is 
often lower than 40%, even for problems in which the data are presented in natural 
frequency format (frequencies that preserve the reference class as “3 of 4” instead of 
normalized ratios such as “75%”; e.g., Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Brase, 2009; Chapman 
& Liu, 2009; Evans et al., 2000; Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; 
Hoffrage et al., 2015; Pighin et al, 2016;  Sloman et al., 2003; Sirota et al., 2014a,b; 
Sloman et al., 2003; see also the meta-analysis by McDowell & Jacobs, 2017).  
As suggested recently by Johnson & Tubau (2017), Bayesian word-problems 
reporting natural frequencies can be as difficult as the ones reporting percentages 
Seeing ratios 4 
because they do not eliminate the relational misalignment between presented and 
requested relations. More specifically, in standard verbal presentations, numbers are 
associated with either the set or the subset of the relationship. For instance, numbers in 
bold in the examples “of 4 women with breast cancer, 3 receive a positive 
mammogram” and “of 96 women without breast cancer, 12 receive a positive 
mammogram” specify the size of corresponding subset. As observed in similarity 
judgments and analogical reasoning, “objects are placed in correspondence based on 
their roles within the matching relational structure” (Markman & Gentner, 1993, p. 
459). Accordingly, number-relational role associations induced from standard 
presentations make it possible to use such numbers in a similar role (“of 4+96 women, 
3+12 receive a positive mammogram”), but hinder their use in a different role, as 
required in the Bayesian inference “of 3+12 women with positive mammogram, 3 
have breast cancer,” where the bold part indicates the set (posterior reference class in 
Figure 1). In this regard, inaccurate Bayesian reasoning might be caused not only by a 
limited understanding of the nested-set structure of the data (Barbey & Sloman, 2007), 
or how to translate frequencies into probabilities (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; 
Gigerenzer, 1991), but by difficulties involved in mapping the presented relationships 
onto the requested one (preliminary evidences supporting this proposal, using natural 




Interestingly, and also consistent with this proposal, problems that present the 
sample statistics as frequency grids or icon arrays make it easier to solve the Bayesian 
question in frequency format, compared to verbal presentations alone (e.g., Brase, 2009 
and 2014; Galesic, Garcia-Retamero & Gigerenzer, 2009; Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage, 
2013; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001; but see Brase & Hill, 2017; Cosmides & Tooby, 
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1996 and Sirota et al, 2014b for mixed findings). Critically, by explicitly presenting the 
requested set and subset in overlapping areas, icons reduce the relational reasoning 
demand of the Bayesian inference (i.e., the posterior ratio can be seen at a glance; see 
Figure 2). The benefit of icons seems to be stronger when they are presented without the 
redundant text (e.g., Khan et al., 2015; Ottley et al., 2016), a fact that suggests that 
standard verbal presentations promote the formation of misleading associations (Barbey 
& Sloman, 2007; Johnson & Tubau, 2015). Indeed, the null benefit of icons (see 
references above) was observed in icons+text presentations. Hence, a better relational 
alignment, together with reduced interference from misleading verbal associations, 
might explain the benefit of icons for Bayesian problem solving. 
Figure 2 
Previous studies have demonstrated the benefit of icons for inferring either 
frequencies in subsets or individual chances, but in both cases through questions that 
refer to the specific quantities represented in the array (e.g., “Imagine Michael is tested 
now. Out of a total of 100 chances, Michael has _____ chance(s) of a positive reaction 
from the test, _____ of which will be associated with actually having the infection”; 
Brase, 2009). However, a stronger proof of the usefulness of icons for understanding 
individual risks would be provided by requesting estimates of individual probabilities, 
without prompting a determined reference class. By using more ambiguous questions, it 
would be possible to study the extent to which icons enhance comprehension of the 
ratio, beyond the represented quantities. If this were the case, icons might induce more 
accurate estimates and the use of equivalent expressions; that is, the use of different 
numbers to express the same probability (e.g., the posterior probability in the 
mammogram problem presented in the appendix can be expressed as “3 of 15”, “1 of 
5”, “20 of 100” or “2 of 10”).  The present research aimed to test this hypothesis by 
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analyzing the form and the accuracy of participants’ probability estimates, based on data 
presented either in iconic or verbal formats. Given that natural frequency problems 
commonly prompt to infer frequencies in determined set and subset (frequency 
question), it is uncertain the extent to which, compared to percentages, natural 
frequencies facilitate inferring single-event probabilities. In this sense, a second goal of 
this research was to shed light into this issue by using a probability question. Finally, it 
also aimed to test whether the differences between formats might depend on the 
alignment of the request (aligned or misaligned with the presented relationships). 
Experiment 1 
To test the benefit of icons for ratio comprehension, problems that presented the 
sample statistics in one of three formats (icon arrays: IA; natural frequencies: NF; and 
percentages: PE) and that requested a single-event probability were presented to three 
groups (see the appendix). In contrast to PE problems, which unambiguously prompt 
the use of a percentage, we expected to observe different interpretations of the requested 
subset and reference class in the responses to IA and NF problems. Due to the increased 
computational demands, we also expected less accurate normalized responses (e.g., 
percentages) than non-normalized ones (e.g., ratios of represented frequencies). 
Nevertheless, if icons enhance comprehension of the requested ratio, compared to the 





 One hundred and forty (36 men and 104 women; mean age=22.87 years, SD=5.57) 
psychology undergraduates from the University of Barcelona took part in this 
experiment before being introduced to Bayes’ rule. All of them provided written 
consent and the research was approved by the University of Barcelona’s Bioethics 
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Commission. Participants were randomly assigned to three groups according to the 
format in which the data were presented (icon arrays: N=49; natural frequencies: N= 49; 
percentages: N=42). Given that each participant solved two problems (see below), we 
analyzed more than 80 responses for each condition.  
Materials and procedure 
 All participants had to evaluate the two health scenarios shown in the appendix, 
with the data presented in one of the three formats: IA, NF or PE. The single-event 
probability question was identical across the three groups. Participants were tested 
collectively, but each had their own computer and solved the task individually by typing 
the requested responses in “X of Y” or “%” in PE format (see question in the appendix). 
There were no time limits for responses, but all participants finished the whole exercise 
in less than 20 minutes.  
Results and discussion 
 
 Responses were coded as correct when the division of the proposed numbers 
matched the mathematical probability, i.e., 0.2 in the mammogram problem and 0.33 in 
the hypertension problem. For the latter, responses rounded to 0.3 were also considered 
correct (IA: 5 responses; NF: 1 response; PE: 4 responses). Given the match between 
this rounded response and the false-alarm rate, rounded responses expressed as “24 of 
80” were not counted as correct (1 response in NF format1). Accuracy levels for the two 
scenarios were similar in each format (ps>.11), so the analyses were performed by 
taking the total of correct responses (0, 1 or 2) for each participant into account.  
 As expected, we observed that the problem format had a significant effect on 
accuracy (χ2(4)=89.16, p<.001, V=.56; see Figure 3). The mean numbers of correct 
                                                 
1 We are aware that the response “30%” also coincides with the literal representation of the false-alarm rate 
for the PE group. Nevertheless, given the extremely low percent accuracy for this group (0% according to 
the strict criterion; 5% considering the rounded responses), the reported effects are independent of the 
interpretation of this ambiguity.  
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estimates for IA, NF and PE groups were 1.54, 0.22 and 0.1, respectively. Differences 
were significant between IA and NF groups (χ2(2)=55.82, p<.001, V=.75), and between 
IA and PE groups (χ2(2)=61.15, p<.001, V=.82). No significant difference was found 
between NF and PE groups (χ2(2)=2.41, p=.30, V=16).  
Figure 3 
  
 Regarding the response format, responses to NF problems included the 100 in the 
denominator more often than responses to IA (Mammogram scenario: 63% vs 31%; 
χ2(1)=10.49, p=.001, ϕ=.33; Hypertension scenario: 71% vs. 33%; χ2(1)=14.76, 
p<.001, ϕ=.39). As expected, accuracy was lower for these apparently normalized 
responses2 than for non-normalized responses in each format and for each problem (IA-
mammogram: χ2(1)=11.43, p=.001, ϕ=.49; IA-hypertension: χ2(1)=5.54, p=.02, ϕ=.38; 
NF-mammogram: χ2(1)=11.38, p=.001, ϕ=.49), except for the NF-hypertension scenario 
(p>.21), due to the very few correct responses (see Table 1). Crucially, responses to IA 
problems were more accurate than responses to NF problems, either among normalized 
(Mammogram scenario: χ2(1)=13.28, p<.001, ϕ=.54; Hypertension scenario: 
χ2(1)=23.1, p<.001, ϕ=.67) or non-normalized responses (Mammogram scenario: 
χ2(1)=14.42, p<.001, ϕ=.54; Hypertension scenario: χ2(1)=25.83, p<.001, ϕ=.75). 
Moreover, as shown in Table 1, 34% of the correct non-normalized responses to IA 
problems (in total 20 of 59) were simplified ratios (e.g., “1 of 3” instead of “12 of 36”), 







                                                 
2 We considered the use of 100 or 10 (only observed in IA responses) in the denominator as an attempt to 
normalize the response. Nevertheless, as discussed below, most of the NF responses using the 100 might 
not be “true” normalization attempts, but rather a consequence of misleading associations. 
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Table 1. Overall percentage of correct responses, and corresponding frequencies for 
each scenario, among normalized (including 100 or 10 as denominator), and non-
normalized ratios in Experiment 1 (frequencies of correct simplified ratios, as “1/3” 
instead of “12/36”, are shown within parentheses). 
 
 Type of ratio 
 Normalized  Non-Normalized 
Icon Array1 55% 
Mammogram: 7 of 15 
91% 
Mammogram: 30 of 33 (7) 




Mammogram: 1 of 31 
29% 
Mammogram: 7 of 17 (1) 
Hypertension: 1 of 35 Hypertension: 2 of 14 (0) 
Percentages 5% 
Mammogram: 0 of 42  
Hypertension: 4 of 42 




 An analysis of the errors showed differences between the scenarios (see Figure 4). 
For the mammogram scenario, the most common errors were caused by confusion with 
the hit rate (12% and 36% for NF and PE formats, respectively), the total positive rate 
(22% and 10% for NF and PE formats, respectively) and the base rate (10% for either 
NF or PE format). For the hypertension scenario, the most common sources of 
confusion were the base rate (30% and 29% for NF and PE formats, respectively) and 
the hit rate (13% and 10%, for NF and PE formats, respectively). The few errors 
detected in the IA responses were equally distributed among the abovementioned 
categories.  
Figure 4  
 In sum, the probability estimates based on icons were more accurate and expressed 
in more diverse equivalent forms than those based on verbal formats. These findings 
support the hypothesis that icons facilitate the comprehension of the ratio beyond the 
represented quantities. Furthermore, the large distribution of errors in both verbal 
formats confirmed the suggestion that verbal presentations induce superficial reasoning 
and misleading associations (Barbey & Sloman, 2007; Johnson & Tubau, 2017). Results 
also suggest that natural frequencies, like percentages, are unhelpful for inferring single-
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event probabilities. Nevertheless, as previously shown in the context of frequency 
estimates (Johnson & Tubau, 2017), this limitation might be related to the misalignment 
of the Bayesian inference. Experiment 2 aimed to test this hypothesis. 
Experiment 2 
 Based on the alignment hypothesis (Johnson & Tubau, 2017), we hypothesized that 
icons would facilitate the comprehension of the ratio through a more direct mapping 
between the data and the request. Nevertheless, alternative explanations might also 
hold. The advantage of icons has been attributed to their role enhancing a frequentist 
interpretation of the requested chances (Brase, 2009 and 2014; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1996), or a clearer representation of the nested-set structure of the data (Barbey & 
Sloman, 2007; Reyna, 2004). Therefore, besides theoretical discrepancies between these 
accounts (see for example the comments on Barbey & Sloman, 2007), both would 
predict differences between iconic and verbal formats for estimates requiring identical 
computation. In contrast, the relational alignment hypothesis would predict differences 
between formats mainly in case of misalignment between presented and requested 
relationships.   
 In order to test these hypotheses, new groups of participants saw/read the previous 
IA or NF data, but were requested two single-event probability estimates requiring the 
same arithmetical steps but differing in their alignment with the text (see Materials and 
procedure). Based on the frequentist or nested-sets accounts, we expected a significant 
effect of format for both estimates. Nevertheless, from the relational alignment 
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Participants 
 One hundred and sixteen students (16 men and 100 women; mean age=21.28 years, 
SD=2.68) from the same population as in Experiment 1 took part in this experiment. All 
of them also provided written consent. Participants were randomly assigned to two 
groups according to the format in which the data were presented (icon arrays: N=57; 
natural frequencies: N= 59). None of them had participated in similar experiments 
before. 
Materials and procedure 
 As in the previous experiment, all the participants had to evaluate the two health 
scenarios shown in the appendix, with the data presented in one of two formats: IA or 
NF. The problems ended with two single-event probability requests: the aligned one 
required to estimate the probability of the datum (e.g., what is the probability of a 
woman at that age to get a positive mammogram?), whereas the misaligned one 
required to estimate the posterior probability of suffering the disease, knowing the 
datum (see the appendix).  Note that both responses require adding the same subsets but 
for a different role: as a new subset “(3+12) of 100” in the aligned response, or as a new 
reference class “3 of (3+12)” in the misaligned one. Furthermore, as shown in the 
appendix, we changed the numbers in the hypertension scenario to avoid the 
coincidence between the false positive rate and the rounded Bayesian estimate. 
Results and discussion 
 
 Responses were coded as correct when the division of the proposed numbers 
matched the mathematical probability (0.15 and 0.24 for the aligned estimate; 0.2 and 
0.33 for the misaligned one for mammogram and hypertension scenarios, respectively). 
For the hypertension scenario, the posterior probability estimate rounded to 0.3 was also 
considered correct (IA: 4 responses; NF: 3 responses). Accuracy levels for the two 
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scenarios were similar in each format (ps>.48), so the analyses were performed with the 
total of correct responses (0, 1 or 2) for each participant and question (aligned and 
misaligned). Figure 5 shows the percentage of participants in each category. 
Figure 5 
   For the aligned requests, the mean number of correct estimates was similar in 
both groups: 1.44 and 1.38 for the IA and the NF groups, respectively (p=.25). For the 
misaligned ones, results replicated previous findings: the mean number of correct 
estimates was higher for the IA group than for the NF group (1.36 vs 0.44; χ2(2)=32.64, 
p<.001, V=.53; see Figure 5), and the difference between groups was significant for 
either normalized (Mammogram scenario: χ2(1)=21.32, p<.001, ϕ=.50; Hypertension 
scenario: χ2(1)=19.10, p<.001, ϕ=.48), or non-normalized responses (Mammogram 
scenario: χ2(1)=4.08, p=.04, ϕ=.36; Hypertension scenario: χ2(1)=5.26, p=.02, ϕ=.41).  
Correct simplifications of the ratio were also more common among responses to IA 
problems (10 responses in total3) than to NF problems (2 responses; see Table 2). 
Hence, these findings supported the hypothesis that natural frequencies verbally 
presented would be particularly misleading for misaligned requests, being as useful as 
icons for inferring single-event probabilities from aligned relationships.  In contrast, by 








                                                 
3 In Experiment 2, most of the Bayesian (misaligned) ratios used 10 or 100 as denominator (66% and 
80% for IA and NF formats, respectively). Therefore, although simplifications were fewer than in 
Experiment 1, the overall percentage of correct responses to IA problems expressed as equivalent ratios 
was indeed higher (49% vs 67% for Experiments 1 vs 2). 
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Table 2. Overall percentage of correct responses to the misaligned question, and 
corresponding frequencies for each scenario, among normalized (including 100 or 10 as 
denominator) and non-normalized ratios in Experiment 2 (frequencies of correct 
simplified ratios, as “1/3” instead of “8/24”, are shown within parentheses). 
 
 Type of ratio 
 Normalized  Non-Normalized 
Icon Array1 56% 
Mammogram: 23 of 38 
95% 
Mammogram: 17 of 18 (3) 




Mammogram:  6 of 47 
67% 
Mammogram:  7 of 12 (1) 
Hypertension:  4 of 47 Hypertension:  9 of 12 (1) 




 The present research aimed to test the hypothesis that icon arrays facilitate Bayesian 
reasoning by enhancing comprehension of the ratio, beyond the represented quantities. 
This proposal was supported by the results of both experiments, which showed that icon 
arrays not only promoted selection of the correct numerator and denominator, but also 
induced further numerical processing, as demonstrated by the use of correct equivalent 
expressions for the requested probability. Results of Experiment 2 also showed that 
icons promoted equally accurate estimates for any request (probability of the datum or 
posterior probability). In contrast, for natural frequencies, whereas estimates aligned 
with the text (probability of the datum) were as accurate as the ones based on icons, the 
misaligned estimates (posterior probability) were mostly inaccurate. Therefore, a critical 
difficulty for Bayesian reasoning based on verbal formats (including either percentages 
or natural frequencies) seems to be the misalignment between presented and requested 
relationships (Johnson & Tubau, 2017). This relational misalignment might explain the 
dependency of the Bayesian inference on capacities and skills beyond numeracy (e.g., 
Chapman & Liu, 2001), such as working memory or reflective thinking (e.g., Lessage et 
al, 2013; Sirota et al, 2014a). 
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 Importantly, the single-event posterior probability estimates based on icons were as 
accurate as frequency estimates, as shown in a pilot experiment4. This finding argues 
against an intrinsic difficulty with understanding single-event probabilities (e.g., 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; see similar claims in Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson-
Laird et al., 1999; Pighin et al., 2017). Specifically, the tendency to simplify the 
description of the sample statistics (e.g., from “3 of 15” to “1 of 5” or “20%”), observed 
in half (Experiment 1) or in most (Experiment 2) of the correct responses to IA 
problems, might point towards the conceptualization of probability as an individual 
propensity (Gillies, 2000), or as a subjective degree of confidence induced from the 
sample statistics (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 19965). Accordingly, icons might promote a 
gist comprehension of the risk; that is, a comprehension of the numerical relation 
beyond the specific numbers (e.g., Reyna, 2004). Equivalent expressions were less 
frequent among the responses to NF problems, which would suggest that verbal 
presentations promote a more superficial processing of the data. 
 Of note was the finding that, among correct estimates of the posterior ratio in 
Experiment 2, normalizations were more frequent than in Experiment 1 in both formats 
(NF: 2 vs 10; IA: 17 vs 42, for experiments 1 vs 2). This might stem from the influence 
of the first request, which prompted to use the total sample of 100 as reference class. 
Nevertheless, the posterior probability (misaligned) estimates based on natural 
                                                 
4 In the pilot experiment, different groups received the same IA and NF problems of Experiment 1 (see 
appendix), but were asked for frequencies (e.g., “of the women who test positive, how many have breast 
cancer?”), in the IA (N=20) and NF (N=22) formats. For the IA group, the mean number of correct 
responses was similar as in the present experiments (1.42). For the NF group, it was higher than in present 
experiments (0.82), but still lower than for the IA group (p=.02).    
5 Although a default frequency-based representation is defended by these authors, it is also claimed that a 
frequentist mechanism might produce subjective confidence for single event probabilities: “even though it 
might initially output a frequency, and perhaps even store the information as such, other mechanisms may 
make that frequentist output consciously accessible in the form of a subjective degree of confidence” 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1996, p. 66, note 19).  
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frequencies were still mostly inaccurate, even for participants who produced accurate 
probability (aligned) estimates of the datum6.   
 It is also worth noting that, in line with previous observations (e.g., Evans et al., 
2000; Hafenbrändl & Hoffrage, 2015; Johnson & Tubau, 2017; Pennycook & 
Thompson, 2012), the analysis of incorrect responses to either NF or PE problems of 
Experiment 1 showed highly variable estimates of the posterior probability (between .03 
and .95; see Figure 4). This is also coherent with superficial processing of relevant 
numerals, without the necessary integration, which might be caused by the relational 
misalignment between presented and requested set-subset relationships (see also 
Holyoak & Koh, 1987, for similar arguments in other problem-solving tasks). 
Differences in the frequency of specific errors also confirm the influence of superficial 
traits as the numerical format (the hit rate was more often selected when presented as a 
percentage; see also Hafenbrändl & Hoffrage, 2015), the relative magnitude of 
presented numbers (the base rate .2 in the hypertension scenario was selected more 
often than the base rate .04 in the mammogram scenario), or the ease of performing 
certain arithmetic calculations (e.g., the total positive 3+12 in the mammogram scenario 
was selected more often than the total high sodium diet 12+24 in the hypertension 
scenario; see Figure 4). The responses to IA problems were affected by these superficial 
traits to a much lesser degree, with only a few attributed to the abovementioned errors. 
Accordingly, more integrated pictures such as icon arrays might be useful tools for 
overcoming misleading “associative tendencies” (Barbey & Sloman, 2007).   
In conclusion, an important step towards facilitating probabilistic reasoning 
consists of enhancing the comprehension of statistical data and the corresponding 
mapping onto the required estimate. In that regard, the present findings confirm the 
                                                 
6 For NF problems, the mean number of correct posterior probability estimates, among participants who 
correctly estimated both probabilities of the datum, was 0.5. For IA problems, this mean was 1.6. 
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advantage of icon arrays for fostering a visual grasp of quantitative relationships. 
Importantly, as demonstrated by the use of equivalent expressions for the requested 
probability, present findings suggest that icons enhance the comprehension of the ratio 
beyond the represented frequencies. Therefore, a much better understanding of 
individual risks can be achieved by promoting the apprehension of ratios rather than 
numbers. Whether icons would enhance single-event probabilistic reasoning in other 
non-university population, or to what extent they would benefit actual decision making, 
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Appendix 
Problems presented in each format in each experiment (original in Spanish).  
1
Corresponding icon array was presented (see an example in Figure 2) 2Alignemnet was manipulated 
regarding the relational match between presented and requested relations in verbal formats (see further 




MAMMOGRAM PROBLEM (Experiment 1) 
Icon Array (IA): The following 
figure1 shows the prevalence of 
breast cancer among women 
over 50 who participate in 
routine screening, as well as the 
results of the mammogram for 
women who have and do not 
have breast cancer. 
Natural Frequencies (NF): 
Among 100 women over 50 who 
participate in routine screening, 
4 have breast cancer. 3 of the 4 
women with breast cancer and 
12 of the 96 women without 
breast cancer receive a positive 
mammogram. 
Percentages (PE): Among the 
women over 50 who participate 
in routine screening, 4% have 
breast cancer. 75% of the 
women with breast cancer and 
12% of the women without 
breast cancer receive a positive 
mammogram. 
Posterior probability question: Imagine a friend at that age receives a positive mammogram. Based 
on the above information, what is the probability of her having breast cancer?  
(NF and IA versions prompted a “X of Y” response; PE version prompted a “%” response) 
HYPERTENSION PROBLEM (Experiment 1) 
IA: The following figure1 shows 
the prevalence of hypertension 
among women over 40 who 
participate in routine screening, 
as well as the type of diet 
followed by women who have 
and do not have hypertension. 
NF: Among 100 women over 40 
who participate in routine 
screening, 20 have hypertension. 
12 of the 20 women with 
hypertension and 24 of the 80 
women without hypertension 
follow a sodium-rich diet. 
PE: Among the women over 40 
who participate in routine 
screening, 20% have 
hypertension. 60% of the 
women with hypertension and 
30% of the women without 
hypertension follow a sodium-
rich diet. 
Posterior probability question: Imagine a friend at that age follows a sodium-rich diet.  
Based on the above information, what is the probability of her having hypertension?  
(NF and IA versions prompted a “X of Y” response; PE version prompted a “%” response) 
MAMMOGRAM PROBLEM (Experiment 2) 
IA: The following figure1 shows the prevalence of 
breast cancer among women over 50 who 
participate in routine screening, as well as the 
results of the mammogram for women who have 
and do not have breast cancer. 
NF: Among 100 women over 50 who participate 
in routine screening, 4 have breast cancer and 
96 have not breast cancer. 3 of the women with 
breast cancer and 12 of the women without 
breast cancer receive a positive mammogram. 
Aligned question2 (probability of the datum): Based on the above data, what is the probability of a 
woman at that age receiving a positive mammogram? (X of Y) 
Misaligned question (posterior probability): (the same as in Experiment 1) 
HYPERTENSION PROBLEM (Experiment 2) 
IA: The following figure1 shows the prevalence of 
hypertension among women over 40 who 
participate in routine screening, as well as the type 
of diet followed by women who have and do not 
have hypertension. 
NF: Among 100 women over 40 who participate 
in routine screening, 10 have hypertension and 
90 have not hypertension. 8 of the women with 
hypertension and 16 of the women without 
hypertension follow a sodium-rich diet. 
Aligned question2 (probability of the datum):  Based on the above data, what is the probability of a 
woman at that age following a rich-sodium diet? (X of Y) 
Misaligned question (posterior probability): (the same as in Experiment 1) 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the numerical relationships presented in the 
appendix (mammogram problem, NF format). Note that the difficulty of calculating the 
posterior reference class does not stem from the addition of the two focal subsets, but on 
the role change from subset to reference class (in bold numbers relevant for the 
posterior ratio; further details can be read in Experiment 2). 
 
Figure 2. Iconic representation of the statistics presented in the appendix (mammogram 
problem; original version in Spanish and in color). 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants who correctly solved none, one, or both problems in 
each group of Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 4. Posterior probability estimates for NF and PE problems of Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of participants who correctly solved none, one, or both problems in 
each group (IA: icon arrays; NF: natural frequencies) and for each question in 
Experiment 2 (alignment refers to the relational match between the question and the text 
of NF problems; aligned question: probability of the datum; misaligned question: 
posterior probability). 
